Library Reference Number: 083
The role played by R.A.F. Bomber Command in the Battle of Britain
"First a short summary of events that led to the threat of invasion of our country.
On May 10th 1940 the German offensive began and strategic airfields were captured by paratroops. The Dutch had declared their neutrality, but this did not save defenceless Rotterdam which was bombed without mercy. Over one square mile of the city centre was set on fire and twenty thousand homes were destroyed. Seventy-eight thousand people were made homeless and many killed.
Belgium was next; Antwerp, Brussels and Namur received a similar fate. The Panzer Divisions, some 1400 tanks with Luftwaffe support, swept through Holland and Belgium smashing all opposition as they advanced. Next France was overrun with brutal efficiency by the full weight of German armour with air support. On 22nd June 1940, France surrendered and in six weeks it was all over. Hitler stood on the Palais de Chaillot, in front of the Eiffel Tower, to declare to the World that he is the master of Europe and that "Britain Stands Alone" and in the way of complete victory.
In Germany confidence was high. According to a late news item in the 'Daily Telegraph' dated 30`h August 1940, it was stated that "German people are now convinced that war will end next month." Also, according to a group of Scandinavian visitors returning from Leipzig Fair and interviewed by a Stockholm newspaper, they reported that Germans had told them ".. that bad weather was the only reason for the delay in launching a large-scale, decisive offensive against Britain. Invasion is Imminent."
In this crisis situation, the Royal Air Force found itself in the front line of defence. Aircrew - mostly young men, had
the fate of our country in their hands. Fighter Command's role was to defend our nation from air attack and to prevent
the enemy from attacking key installations - ideally before the bombers reached their targets, while Bomber Command was
given the task of attacking strategic targets in Germany and occupied Europe.
During the Battle of Britain, Bomber Command had two distinct objectives:
(1) To deter the German Invasion Fleet from setting sail, and
(2) To attack and destroy shipping concentrated in the French Ports of Dunkirk, Calais & Ostend. 1,000 ships and barges were massed for Invasion including those at Antwerp, also 600 in the Scheldt estuary. Those ports were heavily defended, reinforced by anti-aircraft units in support of the army - some 6,700 light and 2,600 heavy guns.
Despite these formidable defences, the RAF Bombers pressed home their attacks, inflicting heavy damage on the Invasion Fleet and ancillary equipment. The well-known historian A.P.Taylor described one raid on 13`h September 1940 "Did enormous damage at Ostend alone - 80 huge barges sunk!" A Coastal Command pilot more accustomed to flying during daylight, described the scene "The coastline from Dunkirk to Calais became known as the 'Blackpool Front.' The whole French coast seemed to be ablaze, and a barrier of flame with coloured shells lighting up the sky, broken only by the intense white flashes of exploding bombs. Definitely not for the faint-hearted!" With my own crew, we bombed the shipping tied up in the ports of Calais, Dunkirk, Ostend and Antwerp, suffering ack-ack damage, severe enough for two of our aircraft being grounded for repair. One Wellington had two large holes ripped out of its fuselage. There were other hazards in a crowded airspace.On a return flight from bombing Ostend docks, an aircraft outward bound passed directly overhead with about 50 ft to spare - a very close call! The bombing attacks by the RAF left a sizeable proportion of the German Invasion Fleet destroyed, and Hitler found Fighter Command too tough a nut to crack. Firstly he was forced to postpone the invasion - and finally abandoned it.
I have to include in this discussion another event of extreme importance, but less well known. This being the complete change of tactics by the Luftwaffe, and what brought it about. This was when Goering, Hitler's deputy shot himself in the foot, which is rather pleasing. To appreciate the magnitude of this change, we have to examine the tactics adopted by the Luftwaffe to reach their goal of air supremacy. Their plan was to attack the very sinews of Fighter Command itself, its airfields, ground organisation, radar stations and the aircraft factories which supplied them. The German Air Force opened their attack on 7th August 1940 with fighter sweeps. The following day the battle for command of the air started in earnest. On 12th August, Ventnor (Isle of Wight) radar station was knocked out, and RAF fighter airfields in general came under very heavy attack. Tangmere suffered heavy damage followed by Kenley (100 bombs), Croydon, Biggin Hill, Debden (100 bombs), North Weald and Hornchurch. Biggin Hill was reduced to shambles with the ops room wrecked. Manston airfield, near the Kent coast, had to be abandoned while the other fighter stations were around London. Fighter Command was being hard pressed, but had to carry on in the face of this onslaught, until relief came from a most unexpected source. Public morale was being affected by the German bombing, and as a boost, Churchill ordered an attack to be made on Berlin by Bomber Command.
I took part in the first raid by Wellington aircraft on 28th August, 1940, returning for a second raid on 31" August. Those raids infuriated Hitler and Goering so much, that in revenge the Luftwaffe was ordered to attack our cities - a complete change of tactics. How can we be sure of this? Goering himself confirmed this in an address to the Luftwaffe on 7th September,1940. Goering stated ".. I now want to take this opportunity of speaking to you, to say this moment is a historic one. As a result of the provocative British attacks on Berlin on recent nights, the Fuhrer has decided to order a mighty blow to be struck in revenge against the capital of the British Empire. I personally have assumed the leadership of this attack, and today I have heard above me the roaring of the victorious German squadrons which now, for the first time, are driving towards the heart of the enemy in full daylight.." . . .(German Wireless Broadcast, 7th September, 1940).
This was the German Air Force's undoing. For the first time, the enemy aircraft massing into formation over France was picked up by our radar. Our fighters were given early warning and were able to climb to the optimum height and position themselves to confront the enemy. The stupidity of large formations sorting themselves out in full view of British radar was not yet fully realised by the Luftwaffe. Sir Hugh Dowding, C.in C.Fighter Command, was acutely aware that his pilots were having a torrid time, and was able to judge the full significance of the change of attack by the Luftwaffe. He called it "a miracle." Hitler's ambitions lay in tatters and, for the first time, success had eluded him. On 17th September, 1940, orders were given for the German army invasion forces to withdraw. The invasion fleet never set sail and the Luftwaffe never achieved mastery of the air.
Britain was saved from invasion by the Royal Air Force, and that was what the 'Battle of Britain' was all about. The young men from U.K. and overseas stood side by side, risking all, with many paying the ultimate price in violent death. We owe them a huge debt!
Sir Max Hastings who was awarded the Somerset Maugham Prize for his book "Bomber Command" (Nov. 1999) wrote "It is one of life's unfairnesses that the public to this day, cherishes the RAF's wartime fighter pilots with an uncomplicated enthusiasm that does not extend to the bomber crews who showed equal courage, and suffered far heavier losses."
Finally, the opinions of other eminent writers:
1) John Terraine who won the 1985 Yorkshire Post `Book of the Year' for his history "The Right of the Line" wrote "It was fortunate indeed for Fighter Command (and for Britain) that the German Air Force had shifted to attack our cities. Fighter Command was stretched like the strings of a violin, but with characteristic opportunism the German High Command switched to the soft target. The attraction of London was the German Air Forces' undoing."
2) Professor Richard Holmes, CBE, TD Security Studies Institute, Cranfield University, writes "... strong evidence that the Wellington raid on Berlin (which would have vexed not simply Hitler but Goering too, as he had announced that if the city was bombed `you can call me Muller') helped change German policy. I have always taken this view - indeed, on page 208 of 'War Walks,2' I wrote that Goering's change of tactics was influenced by Hitler's desire to punish Britain for the RAF's raids on Berlin."